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NEW YORK COLLOCATIONS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
Introduction
In its land use regulation cases, the Supreme Court has set out
fairly definitive tests for determining whether a regulation is a taking.
It should come as no surprise that regulatory agencies dealing with
land use issues will attempt to structure their regulations in such a way
as to avoid a taking.' Agencies follow this course because of the fear
and uncertainty that all takings-no matter how small-must be com-
pensated at fair market value.
2
1. Recently, with the advent of more conservative justices, the Supreme Court has
handed down two rulings likely to make regulators more cautious by setting new bounda-
ries limiting the leeway that regulators have in avoiding a taking. In Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), the Nollans owned a beachfront lot in Ventura
County, California. Id. at 827. The Nollans originally leased their property with an option
to buy. Id. The building on the lot was a small bungalow, which for a time the Nollans
rented to summer vacationers. Id. After years of rental use, the building on the lot had
fallen into disrepair and could no longer be rented. Id. The Nollans' option to purchase
was conditioned on their promise to demolish the bungalow and replace it. Id. at 828. To
complete the demolition, they were required to obtain the permission of the California
Coastal Commission. Id. The California Coastal Commission conditioned the Nollans'
acquiring a coastal development permit on the Nollans' agreement to provide a public
easement across their property. Id. The Supreme Court invalidated this condition because
it did not substantially advance a legitimate state interest. Id. at 857. The Supreme Court
rejected the Coastal Commission's arguments that the Nollans' new house would interfere
with "visual access" to the beach, that it would interfere with the desire of people who
drive past the Nollans' house to use the beach, thus creating a "psychological barrier" to
"access," and that it would somehow increase the use of the public beaches, thus creating
the need for more "access." Id. at 838. The Coastal Commission believed that these bur-
dens on "access" would diminish if the Nollans gave the public "lateral access" to the
beach. Id. The Nollan decision was a far cry from prior rulings, which paid mere lip ser-
vice to the nexus between the regulation and state interest that the regulation was designed
to address. In the past, the causal nexus was generally found to be presumptively valid.
See Charles M. Haar & Jerold Kayden, Private Property v. Public Use, N.Y. TIMES, July 29,
1987, at A23; Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1605-1614 (1988);
Steven J. Lemon et al., Comment, The First Applications of the Nollan Nexus Test: Obser-
vations and Comments, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 585 (1989).
Similarly, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), the regulator attempted to
condition a landowner's acquisition of a permit to build a bigger building upon the granting
of a deed to the city; part of the landowner's property was to be used as a bicycle path and
greenway. The Supreme Court held that the condition was unconstitutional and devised
the rough proportionality test, which put the burden on the state to prove that there was a
nexus between the condition and the legitimate state interest that was to be achieved. Id.
at 2319. The Court essentially elevated the level of scrutiny that it would employ in these
types of cases.
2. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); FCC v.
Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987); Leonard M. Baynes, How Much is the Toll to
Access the Information Superhighway: An Analysis of the Appropriate Level of Compensa-
tion for the Partial Taking of Public Utility Property, 62 TENN. L. REV. 141 (Fall 1994). In
many areas of the law, the effective lawyer will advise clients of the status of the law and
the permissible ways for the clients to achieve their goals. These permissible ways are
colloquially known as loopholes. Because clients expect their attorneys to provide them
with this type of advice, it is not surprising that land use regulators attempt to find and use
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This Article first examines the current takings jurisprudence that
would be applicable to the New York collocation regime:3 (1) per se
takings used when the regulation is of a physically invasive nature, and
(2) regulatory takings used at other times and employing an ad hoc
analysis. The ad hoc analysis considers (1) the character of the regula-
tion, (2) the economic impact on the landowner's investment-backed
expectations, and (3) whether the regulation advances a legitimate
state interest.
This Article then analyzes each of the relevant New York Public
Service Commission (NYPSC) orders in developing its collocation
policy4 to determine whether they constitute a taking of New York
Telephone Company's property and are ultra vires under the New
York Public Service Law. This analysis shows how the NYPSC was
able to swerve around the "takings" and "ultra vires" potholes at each
step of its proceedings. Through its rulemaking proceedings, the
NYPSC was able to set parameters that presented New York Tele-
phone with a Hobson's choice: New York Telephone could either vol-
untarily agree to a physical invasion of its property-physical
collocation-or submit to the NYPSC's order mandating a non-physi-
cal invasion-virtual collocation-which would be administratively
burdensome.' Virtual collocation would also increase the risks of po-
loopholes created by Supreme Court opinions, structuring proposed regulations to achieve
a constitutional result.
3. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "No person
shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend.
V. This clause is often referred to as the Takings Clause. For purposes of this article, the
Takings Clause shall serve as the basis for takings jurisprudence. The Fifth Amendment is
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, Burling-
ton and Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). The Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution specifically applies to the states. It provides that "[no] State
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
4. Collocation involves the placement of a competitor's interconnection equipment
in, or in close proximity to, the central offices of a local telephone company. See generally
Leonard M. Baynes, The On-Ramp to the Information Superhighway: A Case Study of the
New York Collocation and Telecommunications Policy, 7 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 1 (1994);
Baynes, supra note 2, at 147. This placement enhances competition by reducing the costs
of interconnection between the networks of local telephone companies and their competi-
tors, which facilitates the competitor's access to the information superhighway. Id. Since
the competitor's network is usually less extensive than that of the local telephone com-
pany, the competitor often must interconnect with the local telephone company's network
to complete telephone calls. Id.
5. New York Telephone also had the option of amending its rate structure in a man-
ner that would foster collocation. See Baynes, supra note 4, at 3-4. Because it would also
be administratively difficult to determine who was eligible for special rates and what the
rates would be, New York Telephone initially chose a virtual collocation regime. Id. How-
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tential antitrust liability,6 though it probably would not result in a tak-
ing. This choice constituted virtually no choice, and led New York
Telephone to agree to physical collocation, which was the more inva-
sive, though more administratively efficient measure, in fostering
competition.7
The NYPSC's actions and methods in ordering collocation have
national implications for takings jurisprudence. They represent a
means to force the parties to agree to a burdensome invasion of prop-
erty without the regulator actually ordering the invasion. 8  This
"means to an end" allows regulators to avoid the just compensation
requirement of the Takings Clause.
I
Takings Jurisprudence
The cases involving government regulations that take a person's
property cover the spectrum from eminent domain to solely govern-
ment regulation. The eminent domain cases are classic examples of a
government taking of a private person's property: the government
condemns a person's land for public use and must pay the landowner
just compensation for the land. Historically, a taking occurred only
when the state condemned land in eminent domain actions.9 Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon"° expanded the scope of takings jurispru-
ever, since the PSC imposed increasingly onerous requirements on virtual collocation, New
York Telephone found itself in the anomalous position of selecting, monitoring, control-
ling, and repairing equipment dedicated to its competitors. Id. at 28-33.
6. Id. at 33.
7. Interestingly, the NYPSC also set parameters that presented New York Tele-
phone's competitors with the same administrative nightmare. The competitors objected to
virtual collocation because they were unable to own the collocation equipment and were
put in the anomalous position of relying on their competitor-New York Telephone-to
select, monitor, control, and repair the equipment. See id. at 28-33.
8. The implications extend far beyond telecommunications and collocation to actions
of other regulators, e.g., zoning commissions and environmental protection agencies.
These regulators can shape the parameters of their orders to get the desired result: They
first regulate the parties in a manner that is, although constitutional, objectionable to the
regulated entities. Such regulation may encourage (some may say coerce) the regulated
parties to agree to the more burdensome regulation. This more burdensome regulation, if
initially ordered by the regulator, would be unconstitutional as a per se taking. However,
by first ordering a program that is initially unworkable, the regulator creates an environ-
ment that leads the regulated entity to agree to something less burdensome, but perhaps
unconstitutional. By the parties agreeing to this otherwise unconstitutional program, the
regulator avoids the just compensation requirements of the Takings Clause.
9. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 634-36 (1887) (articulating the historical
perspective).
10. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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dence to include government regulations that went too far,
constituting excessive exercises of a state's police power."
Since the Mahon decision, the Supreme Court has established
somewhat rigid boundaries in defining which government regulations
are so excessive as to constitute a taking. In essence, there are two
relevant categories12 for takings cases, which will be employed to ana-
11. In the Mahon case, a landowner transferred title to the surface of his property, but
retained title to the subsurface and the right to remove coal from it. Id. A statute enacted
after the sale of the surface rights prohibited mining so as "to cause the caving-in, collapse,
or subsidence" of any occupied land. Id. at 393. The Court held the statute violated the
takings clause because the prohibition exceeded the state's police power. The Court
stated: "To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the
same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it." Id. at 414.
Therefore, when regulation reaches too great a "magnitude, in most if not in all cases there
must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act." Id. at 413.
12. The Supreme Court recently established another category for takings analysis,
which is not relevant to the issue addressed in this Article. The Supreme Court found a per
se taking when a state regulation denied a landowner all economically beneficial or pro-
ductive use of land. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992).
The Supreme Court justified its creation of this new per se category on the ground that
total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's perspective, the equivalent of
physical appropriation. Id. at 2894 (citing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450
U.S. 621, 652 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Such limitations cannot be newly legislated
or promulgated without compensation unless they are consistent with the state's pre-ex-
isting law of property and nuisance. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
The Supreme Court limited this new rule to regulatory actions that effectively elimi-
nate the land's only economic productive uses, but it did not proscribe regulatory action
against productive uses that are impermissible under relevant property and nuisance prin-
cipals. Id. at 2900-01. The Supreme Court gave two examples: First, the owner of a lake
bed would not be entitled to compensation when denied the relevant permit to engage in
landfill operations that would have the effect of flooding others' land. Second, the corpo-
rate owner of a nuclear generating plant, found to be sitting above an earthquake fault,
would not be entitled to compensation when directed to remove all improvement from its
land. Id. at 2900.
In Lucas, the Supreme Court invalidated a state statute that had the direct effect of
barring the landowner from constructing any permanent habitable structure on his prop-
erty. The 1977 South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act required any owner of
coastal zone land that qualified as "critical area" to obtain a permit from the South Caro-
lina Coastal Council prior to committing the land to "a use other than the use that the
critical area was devoted to on [September 28, 1977]." Id. at 2889. A critical area was
defined in the legislation to include beaches and immediately adjacent sand dunes. Id.
In 1986, Lucas purchased the two lots at issue for $975,000. Id. The two lots were
located on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina. Id. The landowner
intended to build single family homes on these lots. Id. At that time, because no portion
of the lots qualified as a "critical area" under the 1977 statute, he was not required to
obtain a permit from the Council before engaging in any development activity. Id.
In 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act. Id.
In implementing the Act, the Council expanded the protected beachfront and prohibited
Lucas from constructing any occupiable improvements. Id. The Act, however, did allow
the construction of certain nonhabitable improvements, e.g., "wooden walkways no larger
in width than six feet," and "small wooden decks no larger than one hundred forty-four
square feet." Id. at 2890 n.2.
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lyze New York's collocation regime. First, physical invasions of a
landowner's property constitute a per se taking and are tantamount to
eminent domain. The seminal case on this matter is Loretto v. Tele-
Prompter Manhattan CATV Co.13 Second, other state regulatory ac-
tions that have a deleterious effect on private property are analyzed
under a balancing test employed by the Supreme Court in Penn Cen-
tral Transportation Co. v. New York City. 4 Pursuant to this test, em-
ploying an ad hoc factual inquiry, the degree of intrusion to the
landowner is balanced against the societal benefit of the regulation.15
If the public derives a great deal of benefit from the governmental
regulation and the restraint on the private property owner is not ex-
cessive, then the regulation is constitutional. On the other hand, if
little public benefit is derived from the governmental regulation and
the restraint on the private property owner is excessive, the regulation
is unconstitutional.
A. Takings by Physical Invasions
Loretto v. TelePrompter Manhattan CATV Co.1 6 illustrates the
principle that a government order allowing a third party to occupy
private property constitutes a taking. In Loretto, the plaintiff brought
a class action to challenge the constitutionality of Section 828 of the
New York Executive Law.' 7 This statute required landlords to allow
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the South Carolina court for a determina-
tion of whether common-law principles would have prevented the erection of any habita-
ble or productive improvements on the landowner's land. Id. at 2901. The Supreme Court
warned the State that to win its case South Carolina would have to do more than proffer
the legislature's declaration that the landowner's uses were inconsistent with the public
interest. Id. Instead, South Carolina would have to identify background principles of nui-
sance and property law prohibiting use of the property in its present circumstances. Id. at
2901-02.
At least three of the other Justices-two by dissent and one by concurrence-dis-
agreed with the development of a new categorical rule, primarily because the landowner,
although denied the loss of all economic value, could enjoy other attributes of ownership,
e.g., the right to exclude others, the right to picnic, swim, or camp, and the right to live on
the property in a trailer. Id. at 2901-26. The Justices also felt the rule was arbitrary; a
landowner whose property is diminished in value by 95% recovers nothing, while an owner
whose property is diminished 100% recovers the land's full value. See id. at 2919 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). They also disagreed because they felt that a finding of no value must be
considered by reference to the owner's reasonable, investment-backed expectations, un-
derstood in light of the whole of our legal tradition-not just the common law of nuisance.
Id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
13. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
14. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
15. See id. at 124.
16. 458 U.S. at 424.
17. N.Y. Exec. Law § 828 (McKinney Supp. 1982). The statute provided in part:
1. No landlord shall
1995]
the installation of cable television (CATV) facilities on their property.
In addition, the statute prohibited landlords from receiving payments
for the CATV installation in excess of the rate set by the State Com-
mission on Cable Television. Although the Court emphasized the nar-
rowness of its holding, the Loretto Court established the rule that "a
permanent physical occupation is a government action of such a
unique character that it is a taking without regard to other factors that
a court might ordinarily examine. "18 Quoting Penn Central, the Court
further stated that "[a] 'taking' may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion
by government, than when the interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to pro-
mote the common good."' 9 The Supreme Court in Loretto refused to
consider whether the permanent physical occupation served any pub-
lic interest and specifically stated that "a permanent physical occupa-
tion authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public
interests that it may serve. "20
In Loretto, the Supreme Court would not even consider the mag-
nitude of the physical occupation. It stated that "whether the installa-
tion is a taking does not depend on whether the volume of space it
a. interfere with the installation of cable television facilities upon [her] prop-
erty or premises, except that a landlord may require:
i. that the installation of cable television facilities conform to such rea-
sonable conditions as are necessary to protect the safety, functioning
and appearance of the premises, and the convenience and well being of
other tenants;
ii. that the cable television company or the tenant or a combination
thereof bear the entire cost of the installation, operation or removal of
such facilities; and
iii. that the cable television company agree to indemnify the landlord
for any damage caused by the installation, operation or removal of such
facilities.
b. demand or accept payment from any tenant, in any form, in exchange for
permitting cable television service on or within [her] property or premises, or
from any cable television company in exchange therefor in excess of any
amount which the commission shall, by regulation, determine to be
reasonable.
Id.
18. 458 U.S. at 432. The Loretto Court stated that its holding basically reaffirmed
prior Supreme Court precedent. The Loretto Court specifically referred to the case of
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872), in which a unanimous Supreme
Court held that "where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water,
earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to
effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of the Consti-
tution .... " Pumpelly, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 181.
19. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
20. Id.
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occupies is bigger than a breadbox."' 1 The Supreme Court's rationale
for this rule rests on the notion that physical occupation of a prop-
erty-no matter how insignificant-deprives the landowner of an im-
portant stick in the bundle of rights, i.e., the right to exclude others
from the property.22
In FCC v. Florida Power Corp. ,23 the Supreme Court established
certain limits on the Loretto decision. The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals raised, sua sponte, the issue of whether the Pole Attachments
Act was an unconstitutional taking of property without due process of
law.24 Prior to the adoption of the Pole Attachments Act, utility com-
21. Id. at 438 n.16.
22. The Loretto Court also distinguished between cases that involve permanent physi-
cal occupation and those involving physical invasion just short of a permanent occupation.
In permanent physical occupation cases the per se test is used. Where there is a physical
invasion just short of permanent physical occupation, the ad hoc balancing test should be
used, but the invasive character of the governmental action would be emphasized.
The Loretto Court cited to United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), in which the
Court ruled that frequent flights immediately above a land-owner's property constituted a
taking:
If, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, respondents could not
use this land for any purpose, their loss would be complete. It would be as com-
plete as if the United States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken
exclusive possession of it.
Id. at 261.
The Loretto Court also cited Kaiser AETNA v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), in
which a government action, (imposing a navigational servitude that required public access
to a pond), was held a taking. The Court stated that the landowner had reasonably relied
on government consent in connecting the pond to the navigable water. In its decision, the
Court emphasized that the navigational servitude took away the landowner's right to ex-
clude "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly character-
ized as property." Id. at 176. The Court explained its decision:
This is not a case in which the Government is exercising its regulatory powers in a
manner that will cause an insubstantial devaluation of petitioner's private prop-
erty; rather the imposition of the navigational servitude in this context will result
in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina .... And even if the
Government physically invaded only an easement in property, it must nonethe-
less pay compensation.
Id. at 180 (emphasis added).
Another case that highlights the distinction between actual physical invasions and
physical occupations just short of permanent occupations is Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). In Pruneyard, the Court held that a state constitutional re-
quirement that shopping center owners permit individuals to exercise free speech and peti-
tion rights in areas where the owners had invited the general public did not constitute a
taking under the U.S. Constitution. The Pruneyard case can be distinguished from other
cases on the ground that the property owner had not exhibited an interest in excluding all
persons from his property. Therefore, "the fact that [the solicitors] may have 'physically
invaded' [the owner's] property cannot be viewed as determinative." Id. at 84.
23. 480 U.S. 245 (1987).
24. The Pole Attachments Act empowered the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), in the absence of parallel state regulation, to determine "just and reasonable" rates
1995]
panies leased space25 on utility poles to CATV companies.26 In re-
sponse to allegations of overcharging by the utility companies,
Congress passed the Pole Attachments Act authorizing the FCC to
regulate pole attachments.
The Florida Power Corp. Court distinguished the Loretto case on
the ground that the statute considered in Loretto explicitly required
landlords to permit permanent occupation of their property by CATV
companies. By contrast, the Pole Attachments Act (as interpreted by
the FCC) does not permit CATV companies to permanently occupy
utility company property. Under the Pole Attachments Act, the
CATV companies do not have the right to occupy space on utility
poles, and utility companies can refuse to enter into attachment agree-
ments with CATV companies. 27 The Court decided that the per se
rule articulated in Loretto is applicable only when the government
regulation requires the landowner to acquiesce in the occupation.28
The per se rule should not be used when the landowner consents to
the third party's presence on the property, as in Florida Power Corp.
(the Pole Attachments Act contemplates voluntary commercial
leases). 29 Thus, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals
erred in applying the per se rule to the Pole Attachments Act.3"
that a utility company may charge CATV systems for using utility poles to string television
cable.
The Act provides that:
a rate is just and reasonable if it assures a utility the recovery of not less than the
additional costs of providing pole attachments, nor more than an amount deter-
mined by multiplying the percentage of the total useable space, or the percentage
of the total duct or conduit capacity, which is occupied by pole attachment by the
sum of the operating expenses and actual capital costs of the utility attributable to
the entire pole, duct, conduit, or right of way.
47 U.S.C. § 224(d)(1) (1995).
25. CATV companies use utility company poles to run the cable that transports televi-
sion signals to CATV customers. Often no other physical medium is available to the
CATV companies.
26. These leases usually provided that the CATV companies would pay an annual rent
for space on each pole to which cables were attached and would pay the fixed costs of
modifying the poles to make them useable by the CATV companies.
27. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. at 251-52.
28. Id. at 253.
29. Of course, this analysis assumes that a utility would not be governed by the essen-
tial facility doctrine, which requires a utility when it owns an essential facility to give rea-
sonable access to its competitors. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366
(1973). If the utility is governed by such doctrine, a strong argument can be made that the
utility's decision to allow pole attachments was not wholly voluntary since the utility may
have consented in order to avoid antitrust liability. See generally Baynes, supra note 2, at
155 n.59. See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the
Judiciary Attempt to Police the Political Institutions? 77 GEO. L.J. 2031 (1989).
30. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. at 253.
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B. Takings by Regulatory Action
When a government regulation fails to cause a permanent physi-
cal occupation of private property,31 fails to deny the landowner of all
economically beneficial or productive use of the property,32 and is not
a nuisance control,33 the regulation is analyzed under the ad hoc anal-
ysis articulated in the Penn Central case.34 The ad hoc test considers
the following factors: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the
landowner, particularly the extent to which the regulation has inter-
fered with the landowner's distinct investment-backed expectations;
(2) the character of the governmental action; and (3) whether the gov-
ernment is regulating private property by an exercise of legitimate po-
lice power.35 To determine whether the government regulation is an
exercise of legitimate police power, the regulation must be analyzed to
see -whether it was designed to advance the "health, welfare, morals or
safety" of the community.36
In Penn Central, the Supreme Court employed the ad hoc test.37
New York City adopted its Landmarks Preservation Law38 to en-
courage or require the preservation of historic or aesthetically signifi-
cant buildings and areas. The case involved the application of the
New York City Landmarks Preservation Law to Grand Central Termi-
nal (the "Terminal"), which was owned by Penn Central. 39 Penn Cen-
31. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441.
32. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
33. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
34. The Penn Central case caused a great deal of discussion in the literature. See gen-
erally Norman Marcus, The Grand Slam Grand Central Decision: A Euclid for
Landmarks, Favorable Notice for TDR and a Resolution of the Regulatory/Taking Impasse,
7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 730 (1978); The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 228-32
(1978).
35. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 123-24.
38. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 et seq. (1976).
39. The Terminal, opened in 1913, was an example of the French Beaux arts style.
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 115. The Terminal was owned solely by Penn Central. Id. On
August 2, 1967, the New York City Landmarks Preservations Commission designated the
Terminal a "landmark." Id. at 115-16. On January 22, 1968, Penn Central entered into a
renewable 50-year lease and sublease with UGP Properties, Inc. (UGP). Id. at 116.
"Under the terms of the agreement, UGP was to construct a multistory office building
above the Terminal." Id. UGP and Penn Central applied to the Landmarks Preservation
Commission for permission to construct the office building. Id. The Landmarks Preserva-
tion Commission rejected the two proposals submitted. Id. at 117. The first proposal,
Breuer I, provided for the construction of a fifty-five story office building cantilevered
above the existing facade and to rest on the roof of the Terminal. Id. at 116. The second
proposal, Breuer II Revised, provided for the tearing down of a portion of the Terminal,
stripping off some of the features of the Terminal's facade, and constructing a fifty-three
story office building. Id. at 116-17.
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tral brought suit in state court alleging that the Landmark
Preservation Commission's rejection of its building proposals consti-
tuted a taking."n
The Supreme Court discussed several cases in which it had re-
jected "takings" challenges.4' In these cases, although the challenged
regulation sometimes caused the landowner severe economic harm, it
did not interfere with the landowner's reasonable investment-backed
expectations in such a way as to constitute a taking of "property"
under the Fifth Amendment. 2 The Supreme Court also noted that it
was not uncommon to reject the takings challenge even though the
challenged regulation caused substantial harm to the landowner by
prohibiting a previous use to which individual parcels had been
devoted. 3
The Penn Central Court analyzed the Landmarks Preservation
law from the standpoint of whether the interference was of such mag-
nitude that "there must be an exercise of eminent domain to sustain
[it]." 44 The Court said that its inquiry could be confined to the sever-
ity of the law's impact on the landowner's parcel-the Terminal site. 5
The Court noted that the law failed to interfere with the then-present
40. Id. at 119.
41. The cases include: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922);
United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945); United States v. Chandler-
Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913); Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R.R., 197
U.S. 544 (1905); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590, 594 (1962); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 674 n.8 (1976); Miller
v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346 (1953). Id. at 124-28.
42. The Court cited United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945)
(interest in high-water level of river for tailwaters runoff maintaining power head was not
property) and United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913) (no
property interest in navigable waters).
43. The Court used Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), as an example. In Miller, a
state entomologist acting pursuant to state statute ordered the claimants to cut down a
large number of ornamental red cedar trees because they produced a cedar rust fatal to
nearby apple trees. Id. at 277. Although the statute provided for recovery of any expense
incurred in removing the cedars, and permitted the claimants to use the cut trees, it failed
to provide compensation for the value of the standing trees or for the resulting decrease in
market value of the properties as a whole. Id. The Supreme Court did not find cause to
invalidate the statute for its failure to provide compensation. Id. at 277-81. The Court held
that the state might properly make "a choice between the preservation of one class of
property and that of the other." Id. at 279. Since the apple industry was important in the
state involved, the Court concluded that despite the lack of compensation for depreciation
in realty, the state was within "its constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction
of one class of property in order to save another which, in the judgment of the legislature,
is of greater value to the public." Id.
44. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413).
45. Id.
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uses of the Terminal.4 6 The landmark designation permitted the land-
owners to use the property exactly as it had been used in the past: as a
railroad terminal containing office space and concessions.4 7 There-
fore, the landmarks law did not interfere with the landowner's pri-
mary investment-backed expectation concerning the use of the
property.48
Moreover, the Court stated that the landmark law permitted the
landowner to profit from the Terminal by obtaining a "reasonable re-
turn" on its investment.49 The Court also stated that the Landmark
Commission's rejection of the landowners' previous attempts to use
the air rights above the Terminal did not preclude the landowners
from ever using the space. The Court explained:
First, it simply cannot be maintained, on this record, that [landown-
ers] have been prohibited from occupying any portion of the air-
space above the Terminal. While the Commission's actions in
denying applications to construct an office building in excess of 50
stories above the Terminal may indicate that it will refuse to issue a
certificate of appropriateness for any comparably sized structure,
nothing the Commission has said or done suggests an intention to
prohibit any construction above the Terminal.
The Court noted that because the landowners had not sought ap-
proval for the construction of a smaller structure, the Court did not
know whether the Landmarks Preservation Commission would deny
landowners any use of any portion of the airspace above the
Terminal.i
The Court also noted that even though the landowners had been
denied the right to build above the Terminal, they possessed transfera-
ble development rights which allowed them to use air rights in other
city locations. The Court noted:
While these [transferable development] rights may well not have
constituted 'just compensation' if a 'taking' had occurred, the rights
nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens the
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 136, 139. The Penn Central investment-backed expectation analysis probably
comes from Professor Michelman's article on takings. See Frank Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation Law, "
80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1229-34 (1967). For further and more general discussion of the
implications of the Penn Central case, see Mary B. Spector, Note, Vertical and Horizontal
Aspects of Takings Jurisprudence: Is Airspace Property? 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 489, 510-516
(1986); Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations: Is There a Taking?, 31
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3 (1987).
49. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.
50. Id. at 136-37 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 137.
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law has imposed on [landowners] and, for that reason, are to be
taken into account in considering the impact of regulation.5 2
The Court held that the application of New York City's
Landmark Law failed to constitute a "taking" of the landowner's
property because the restrictions were substantially related to the pro-
motion of the general welfare. 53 Furthermore, the law permitted rea-
sonable beneficial use of the landmark site. It also afforded the
landowners opportunities to enhance the Terminal site and other
properties.
5 4
As seen above, two frameworks exist for analyzing takings chal-
lenges: (1) per se takings, and (2) regulatory takings. However, if the
regulated entity voluntarily consents to the regulation, then there is no
taking.
The following sections will explore the factual details of colloca-
tion and its implementation in New York, and whether the New York
collocation regime is a taking.
II
Collocation Decisions of the New York Public
Service Commission
Collocation is achieved by either requiring the placement of com-
petitor's equipment in the central office of a local telephone com-
52. Id. See also Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 188 Cal. Rptr. 191, 198
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982). But see Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P.2d 528 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1985). The unresolved issue of whether transferable development rights can constitute just
compensation has been analyzed by several commentators. See generally RICHARD A. EP-
STEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 188-190
(1985); Development in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1497-501 (1978).
53. The failure of the Penn Central Court to explicitly use the nuisance control ration-
ale has been criticized by commentators. It has been said that "[o]nly by resort to some
such concept as nuisance or noxiousness can we tell losses of value that count from losses
of value that do not." James E. Krier, The Regulation Machine, 1 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 7
(1982).
54. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138. Justice Rehnquist wrote a strong dissent, stating
that he would have remanded the case back to the New York Court of Appeals. Id. at 152.
Justice Rehnquist stated that the majority in Penn Central misapplied the takings law in
two instances. First, landmark preservation is not like nuisance, which usually involves a
substantial state interest in regulating the use of land. Id. at 144-46. Second, landmark
preservation in this instance is not like zoning, a situation in which the benefits and
prohibitions apply over a broad cross section of land, thereby securing "an average reci-
procity of advantage." Id. at 147 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415). In nuisance
and zoning cases, land use restrictions are often struck down; because Penn Central
presented neither situation, Justice Rehnquist would have found a taking. Id. at 151-53.
Justice Rehnquist would have remanded on the issue of just compensation and would have
required the New York Court of Appeals to determine whether the transferable develop-
ment rights would have provided landowners with just compensation. Id. at 151-52.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 18:51
NEW YORK COLLOCATIONS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
pany-physical collocation-or by requiring a local telephone
company to dedicate proprietary equipment located in its central of-
fice to providing interconnection with its competitor's equipment-
virtual collocation. Under a virtual collocation regime, the competi-
tor's equipment could also be located just outside the local telephone
company's central office.55
The New York Public Service Commission has been at the fore-
front of the collocation issue.56 The remainder of this Article focuses
on the actions of the NYPSC in approving the New York collocation
regime; it details each of the NYPSC collocation orders to show how
the New York virtual collocation regime evolved into the current
physical collocation requirement.
A. The New York Public Service Commission Requires Virtual
Collocation for Private Line Service
In Case 29469, Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Re-
view Regulatory Policies for Segments of the Telecommunications In-
dustry Subject to Competition,57 a competitor, Teleport, sought to
collocate its fiber optic facilities inside the central offices of New York
Telephone58 to duplicate New York Telephone's ability to aggregate
low volume traffic. 59 Teleport alleged that New York Telephone re-
fused Teleport's request for interconnection and that this refusal im-
properly prohibited Teleport from effectively competing against New
York Telephone.6" Teleport requested that the NYPSC require New
York Telephone to collocate Teleport's fiber optic facilities at New
York Telephone's central office locations.61 Although the Adminis-
trative Law Judge found no basis for adopting Teleport's proposal,62
the NYPSC overturned that decision.63 The NYPSC stated:
The Judge's view of competition is too restrictive, and it clashes with
emerging open network architecture concepts that encourage un-
bundling the telephone network into elemental components and of-
fering them on a non-discriminatory basis. With some limitations,
therefore, Teleport's proposal is acceptable. Allowing liberal inter-
55. Baynes, supra note 4, at 12.
56. Id. at 16. The FCC and many other states have also considered this issue. See
generally id.
57. Op. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n No. 89-12, 103 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 1 (May 16,
1989) [hereinafter Op. No. 89-12].
58. New York Telephone is a local telephone company that provides local exchange
service within New York State.
59. Op. No. 89-12, supra note 57, at 20-22.
60. Id. at 27.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 27-28.
63. Id. at 28.
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connections with the local exchange network generally fosters com-
petition and will likely provide more effective and efficient carrier
access service.
64
The NYPSC held that "Teleport, as well as other interconnectors
and similar networks of large users,65 should be allowed comparably
efficient interconnections (or, in other words, virtual collocation) for
the purpose of competing with New York Telephone for the transport
portion of private line.., services. ' 66 The NYPSC ordered New York
Telephone to establish comparably efficient interconnections at its lo-
cal central offices, with registered or certified carriers for the transport
of intrastate private line traffic in the New York metropolitan Local
Access Transport Area (LATA). 67 The NYPSC stated that the "physi-
cal location of the interconnection point may be. outside of a New
York Telephone building, but the interconnection must be technically
and economically comparable to actual collocation and the terms must
be reasonable. '68
The PSC justified its decision as fostering competition.69 How-
ever, the PSC acknowledged that its decision could have unreasonable
or extraordinarily adverse impacts on other ratepayers.70 Collocation
would make the local telephone company competitors a more viable
competitive alternative, causing New York Telephone to lose its most
lucrative segment of business: big-business customers. 71 As such, New
York Telephone might have to raise rates to residential and small
business customers to meet its revenue requirements. 72 Recognizing
that collocation would make the local exchange market more competi-
64. Id.
65. The PSC decision is rather broad in that it also allows private companies that by-
pass the local telephone network solely for their individual telephone needs to collocate.
Id. at 28-29.
66. Id. at 28.
67. Id. at 28-29. A LATA generally comprises a standard metropolitan area; it does
not necessarily coincide with the area code for that area. For example, the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts is divided into two LATAs. The area codes "508" and "617" are part of
the LATA for Eastern Massachusetts, whereas the area code "413" is part of the LATA for
Western Massachusetts. LATAs are important because the consent decree divesting
AT&T prohibited local telephone companies from transporting calls between LATAs.
Only long distance companies, e.g., AT&T, Sprint, and MCI can transport calls between
LATAs. Local telephone companies can transport calls only within each LATA. Baynes,
supra note 4, at 19 n.79.
68: Op. No. 89-12, supra note 57, at 29.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 29.
72. Id.
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tive, the NYPSC granted New York Telephone greater pricing flexibil-
ity for two of its private line services.7
B. Implementation of Virtual Collocation for Private Line Service
New York Telephone initially proposed a virtual collocation plan,
which was unacceptable to its competitors and the NYPSC; the initial
proposal did not provide the competitors with technological or eco-
nomic benefits comparable to physical collocation.74 Through infor-
mal discussions, the NYPSC staff worked with the parties to arrive at
a tariff more closely conforming to the NYPSC collocation order.75
As a result of these discussions, New York Telephone introduced
its transport interconnection arrangement (TIA) service.7 6 This ser-
vice gave the New York Telephone competitor an option: it could pro-
vide the entire fiber optic link from the competitor's premises to the
New York Telephone building that houses the wire center to which
the competitor desires interconnection.77 New York Telephone would
73. Specifically, PSC granted New York Telephone the authority to increase rates for
high capacity and interoffice private line services by twenty-five percent annually, and to
decrease them without limitation, so long as the rates covered relevant incremental costs.
This tariff flexibility applied throughout the New York Metropolitan area. New York Tele-
phone was also authorized to offer individual case billing arrangements on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis for services in response to competitive requests. Id. at 31.
74. See Baynes, supra note 4, at 4, 22. To implement the decision in Case 29469, New
York Telephone filed with the PSC a tariff for a new service, then-called "the transport
interconnection arrangement" (TIA), now known as "Optical Transport Interconnection
Service" (OTIS). Id. at 21-22. This proposal as initially submitted did not achieve the
objectives of the PSC in fostering more competition between the competitive access prov-
iders (CAPs) and New York Telephone. Id. at 22. As initially proposed by New York
Telephone, the CAPs had the option of either having the interconnection made at the
CAPs' premises or at the nearest manhole to the New York Telephone central office. Id.
Neither of these options allowed the CAPs to avoid a transport charge for interconnection
with the local exchange network while providing a relatively high quality service. Id. at 24-
25. There were also requirements that locked the CAPs into the equipment and service for
a significant period of time. Id. The CAPs objected to New York Telephone's initial pro-
posal because they believed it was not equivalent to physical collocation. Id. at 22-23. The
CAPs argued that this initial proposal was not technically or economically comparable to
physical collocation because the technology was outdated, actual physical collocation cost
less, and long term contracts locked the CAPs into lease arrangements. Id. at 22-25. The
PSC staff also found the initial New York Telephone proposal lacking because it was not
comparable to physical collocation. Id. The CAPs again demanded that the PSC require
New York Telephone to provide physical collocation of its facilities to CAP equipment. Id.
The PSC staff disagreed with the CAPs' position that because the service offerings by New
York Telephone were problematic, physical collocation was necessitated. Id. at 23-24. The
staff stated that the PSC "specifically declined to order actual physical collocation" and
instead ordered "virtual, comparably efficient, interconnection arrangements." Id.
75. Baynes, supra note 4, at 19.
76. The TIA service later became known as the OTIS I Tariff.
77. Op. No. 89-12, supra note 57.
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supply the collocation equipment,78 but it would be selected by the
competitors within a range of options provided by New York
Telephone.
Teleport, however, remained dissatisfied with the revised Optical
Transport Interconnection Service (OTIS) 79 Tariff8° virtual collocation
arrangement. Teleport's concerns revolved around what constituted
"equal interconnection. '81 It wanted a broader array of interconnec-
tions, control of the type of equipment utilized, and responsibility for
monitoring and control. Teleport contended that if its concerns were
not addressed, a more competitive market for private line service
would not be achieved.8u
The NYPSC waffled on Teleport's demands. It approved the
OTIS Tariff and appeared to side with New York Telephone. The
NYPSC stated that Teleport's demands to "monitor and control" its
circuits, to utilize specific types of equipment, and to have a broader
array of interconnection went beyond the scope of the proceeding.83
But then the NYPSC straddled in favor of Teleport. The NYPSC
stated that New York Telephone and Teleport should be able to utilize
the Open Network Architecture principles 84 inherent in the PSC's or-
78. The collocation equipment was an Optical Line Terminating Multiplexer (OLTM).
Baynes, On-Ramp to Information Superhighway, supra note 3, at 19.
79. See supra note 74.
80. See supra note 73.
81. Op. No. 89-12, supra note 57.
82. Id.
83. The NYPSC stated that Teleport's argument raised two issues: one, whether Tele-
port had the right to request use of specific equipment within New York Telephone's cen-
tral office, and two, if Teleport were granted that right, did Teleport also have the right to
perform the supervision and control functions essential to assure adequate service? Id.
The NYPSC stated that the answers to both questions were unclear. Id.
Given the current state of technology, the NYPSC stated that only New York Tele-
phone can provide supervision and control. Id. New York Telephone has a fundamental
obligation, as a regulated utility, to provide service to its customers, both Teleport and the
end user. Id. The NYPSC stated that this obligation should not be compromised or dele-
gated to third parties. Id.
84. The NYPSC noted, however, that in its recent ruling in the Open Network Archi-
tecture proceeding, the NYPSC required additional unbundling of the local telephone net-
work so that "users can create their own services or networks." Re Telecommunications
Indus. Interconnection Arrangements, Open Network Architecture, and Comparably Effi-
cient Interconnection, 106 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 420, 425 (1989). Open Network Ar-
chitecture requires the local exchange carriers to give independent firms equal access to
the local exchange carrier's features and functions present in the central offices. Again,
this equal access is done .to foster competition between these independent firms and the
local exchange carrier.
The term "unbundling" refers to the shearing off and splitting up of the telephone
network and services into many parts. An historical note should prove explanatory. It is
important to remember that many years ago AT&T provided fully integrated telephone
service. AT&T had objected to placing competitive telephone sets on the network for fear
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der to resolve the outstanding issues, and New York Telephone should
strive to satisfy Teleport's remaining objectives as soon as possible. 5
The NYPSC established a task force (the "Task Force") consisting of
NYPSC staff, New York Telephone, Teleport, and other competitors
to resolve issues of central office multiplexing arrangements, including
a control hierarchy adequate to meet the needs of all parties.8 6
From a takings perspective, the NYPSC order and subsequent de-
velopments avoided a permanent physical occupation of New York
Telephone's property, which would have amounted to a per se taking
under Loretto.87 The OTIS I virtual collocation tariff did not entail
any physical collocation of the competitor's equipment onto New
York Telephone's property. Instead, it authorized a virtual colloca-
tion regime in which the collocation equipment was owned and oper-
ated by New York Telephone. Moreover, New York Telephone was
not required to allow the competitors entry to monitor and control the
collocation equipment. This arrangement, from an administrative
standpoint, was still not wholly satisfactory to New York Telephone
because it remained responsible for selecting, monitoring, and repair-
ing the equipment of a competitor. The NYPSC even noted that this
obligation could very well lead to potential antitrust liability.88
At this stage of the proceedings, the competitors' only objections
were that they could neither select the equipment nor monitor and
control it. From a practical standpoint the competitors' concerns were
justified. They wanted to ensure that there were no problems with the
service they provide customers. One way to achieve that result: ob-
tain as much control as possible over every aspect of the service. The
OTIS I virtual collocation tariff did not provide the competitors with
that opportunity. The competitors had to rely on New York Tele-
phone to select, monitor, and repair crucial equipment. Given the fact
that both sides were still not happy with the OTIS I virtual collocation
regime, it was not surprising that the discussions and negotiations con-
tinued. New York Telephone continued to modify its position.
that it would denigrate the quality of its service. Now, the market for telephone sets is very
competitive, with many competitors providing a range of telephone sets in terms of quality
and price. Similarly, with respect to collocation, even the local telephone network is not
safe from unbundling.
85. Op. No. 89-12, supra note 57.
86. Id.
87. See Loretto, 458 U.S. 419.
88. See Baynes, supra note 4, at 37. There was a risk of antitrust liability because New
York Telephone would be a competitor as well as a supplier of services to its customers. It
was feared New York Telephone might use its in depth knowledge of the competitors'
business activities (that New York Telephone acquired in providing virtual collocation ser-
vice) to steal customers away from the competitors.
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C. Task Force Recommendations
The Task Force submitted its report to the NYPSC on March 15,
1990. The Task Force report recommended that the competitors have
the right to specify the functions and features integral to the colloca-
tion equipment supplied by New York Telephone.8 9 The competitors
had the right-superior to New York Telephone-to monitor and con-
trol New York Telephone-owned collocation equipment and to train
New York Telephone to do likewise.9" New York Telephone also had
the right to jointly monitor and control the competitor's collocation
equipment, once New York Telephone did not interfere with the com-
petitor's right to do the same.91
New York Telephone was the only member of the Task Force to
dissent from the findings.92 New York Telephone argued that the
then-current state of technology allowed only one party to monitor
and control. The Task Force recommendations placed the competitors
at the top of the hierarchy in terms of monitoring and control, with
rights superior to the owner of the equipment-New York Telephone.
Of course, in those central offices that the competitors chose not to
perform the monitoring and control function, they could train New
York Telephone to monitor and control its own equipment. As a re-
sult of the NYPSC order, New York Telephone was stuck with a regu-
latory regime that, although entitled "virtual collocation," was very
similar to physical collocation.93
89. Op. No. 89-12, supra note 57, at 4-6. Along with New York Telephone, they have
the right to prepare, issue, and review any Requests For Proposals for the collocation
equipment. Id. The CAPs would work with New York Telephone to identify vendors




93. New York Telephone owned the equipment that it was required to place on its
premises for the benefit of the competitors. See Baynes, supra note 4, at 33. It had no
control over the functions that this equipment would perform and was not primarily re-
sponsible for monitoring and controlling it. Id. But there was no clear demarcation for
how much responsibility New York Telephone did have as to the equipment. Id. New
York Telephone's responsibility to the equipment could potentially vary in many ways. Id.
For instance, a competitor and New York Telephone could agree that New York Tele-
phone would be responsible for monitoring and controlling collocation equipment when
the competitor is unavailable. They could also agree that New York Telephone would have
principal responsibility for monitoring and controlling equipment only in certain locations,
on certain dates, or at certain times. Id. So, even though New York Telephone's adminis-
trative role would be reduced because it "shared" the monitor-and-control obligation with
the competitors, New York Telephone would be in a much more precarious position be-
cause the demarcation of the monitor-and-control role between New York Telephone and
the competitors would be much more fuzzy. Id. This fuzziness would increase the likeli-
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The NYPSC was the primary beneficiary of this ruling. It
promulgated a virtual collocation regime closely approximating physi-
cal collocation. It accomplished its plan to foster competition. More-
over, since it did not order physical collocation, the NYPSC did not
have to worry about a per se taking challenge. Instead, the ruling en-
couraged (some would say coerced) the parties to agree to the more
administratively practical solution of physical collocation.
D. Physical Collocation for New York Telephone's Private Line Services
As a result of the NYPSC decisions ordering virtual collocation,
the parties began active negotiations to ensure full compliance with
the NYPSC's order. Since neither New York Telephone nor the com-
petitors94 were satisfied with the NYPSC virtual collocation regime, it
was no surprise that New York Telephone changed its position by an-
nouncing in November 1990 its intention to offer actual physical collo-
cation to any competitor that desired it.95
On May 8, 1991, the NYPSC approved New York Telephone's
OTIS II tariff, which provided for physical collocation of a competing
carrier's facilities within any New York Telephone central office. 9 6
This arrangement applied only to private line service. 97 The salient
provisions of the OTIS II tariff were as follows: The competitors could
establish "multiplexing nodes"98 at any New York Telephone wire
hood that New York Telephone would make a mistake as to its role in monitoring and
controlling, increasing the potential for antitrust liability. Id.
94. The competitors got a virtual collocation regime instead of physical collocation.
Baynes, supra note 4, at 33. Although the competitors could select functions and features,
they still did not own the equipment, so they were unable to upgrade, remove, or replace it
as easily. Id. In addition, they were unable to select the actual model of collocation equip-
ment they desired. Id. Although the competitors were primarily responsible for monitor-
ing and controlling the equipment, they were still dependent on New York Telephone,
because in some circumstances New York Telephone would be performing this role. Id.
As will be seen, these parameters, which were conceived by the NYPSC, provided the
perfect opportunity for the parties to reach their own deal, since the current regime was
still not wholly satisfactory to either of them. Id.
95. Order Regarding OTIS II Compliance Filing, Case No. 29469 and Case No. 88-C-
004, 6 (N.Y.P.S.C. May 8, 1991) [hereinafter OTIS II].
96. Id. at 7.
97. Id. The NYPSC noted that this arrangement was the first of its kind in the nation.
Id. The OTIS I Tariff had a sunset provision that expired on December 1991. All OTIS I
tariffed arrangements rolled over into OTIS II. Id. The NYPSC said that under the pro-
posals, the competitors would gain physical access to the "last mile" to all users, and the
real ability to extend their own network to users; this, without the costs of building facili-
ties directly, by accessing them at a point where they have already been aggregated-the
central office building itself. Id.
98. The multiplexing node could contain any of the following equipment: OLTMs,
DS3-to-DS1 and DS1-to-DSO multiplexers, and 3/1 and 1/0 Digital Cross-connect systems.
Id. Equipment supplied must either be on a New York Telephone approved list of prod-
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center or central office specified by the competitor 99 and into which
the competitor would construct fiber optic cables. New York Tele-
phone would designate the floor space within each wire center or cen-
tral office that would constitute the multiplexing node and could
enclose that space in a cage or room. 100 The competitor's employees
would have access, at all times, to the multiplexing nodes, cable, and
associated equipment. The competitor would be responsible for in-
stalling and maintaining its equipment within the multiplexing node
and its fiber optic cables.10 1
As a result of the NYPSC order, New York Telephone did not
own the equipment that was placed in its central offices; the competi-
tors owned the equipment. Thus, New York Telephone avoided the
administrative nightmare of selecting, monitoring, and controlling its
competitors' collocation equipment. As a result, the potential for an-
titrust liability was diminished. 102 However, New York Telephone was
now disadvantaged in that a competitor owned equipment located on
New York Telephone property.10 3
ucts or comply with Bellcore standards. Id. Bellcore is a subsidiary, jointly owned by each
of the former Bell Operating Companies (BOCs). It provides technical support and re-
search and development to the BOCs.
99. The wire center/central office had to be listed in the National Exchange Carrier
Association (NECA) Tariff No. 4. Id.
100. The minimum space would be 100 square feet per node; additional space was nec-
essary. Id. New York Telephone would provide the environmental support necessary for
the competitor's multiplexing node in the same manner that New York Telephone provides
for its own equipment. Id. This environmental support would consist of electric power,
battery and generator backup power, heat, and air conditioning. Id.
101. The collocation service was tariffed, but a license agreement would govern the
terms, conditions, and rental rate for the collocated space. The tariff also provided that
New York Telephone would provide certain cross-connect frames within each central of-
fice/wire center to serve as a demarcation point between the competitor and New York
Telephone services. Id. New York Telephone bears the responsibility for maintenance and
related activities on its side of the demarcation point. Collocation space is allocated among
competitors on a "first come, first served" basis.
102. The NYPSC even acknowledged this factor; when New York Telephone decided to
employ "physical" collocation, the NYPSC stated that New York Telephone was then re-
leased from the onerous administrative burdens related to "improving" OTIS I. Id. More-
over, the NYPSC noted that by providing "physical" collocation, New York Telephone was
released from possible charges of anti-competitive practices were it to find itself in the
business of provisioning equipment for competitors' end users under a virtual collocation
arrangement, while simultaneously negotiating for the same end-users in a competitive
marketplace. Id. New York Telephone realized, the Staff believed, that no matter how
hard it tried to deal honestly with this dual role, it would always run some risk of being
accused of anticompetitive practices. Id.
103. As a result of the New York NYPSC order, the competitors received a physical
collocation regime. Because they were able to own their equipment, they could upgrade,
remove, or replace it easily. In addition, they were able to select the actual model of
collocation equipment they desired. The competitors were primarily responsible for moni-
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As a result of its order, the NYPSC established a physical colloca-
tion regime to which the parties consented. Since its initial ruling re-
quired virtual collocation-not physical collocation-the NYPSC did
not have to worry as much about a per se taking challenge.
By agreeing to physical collocation, New York Telephone also
benefitted. In exchange for its consent, New York Telephone received
inducements from the NYPSC and competitors: The competitors
agreed to pay New York Telephone an amount for interconnection
that would serve as contribution1" for the expected revenue losses
that New York Telephone would incur as a result of physical colloca-
tion. This contribution would allow New York Telephone to continue
providing low cost service to its embedded base of residential custom-
ers. New York Telephone also received certain pricing flexibility" 5
for the private line market-the very market in which the NYPSC is
trying to foster competition. This pricing flexibility will likely allow
New York Telephone to compete more effectively against the
competitors.
III
New York Collocation: Is It a Per Se or Regulatory
Taking?
A. Analysis of New York Collocation as a Per Se Taking
1. Traditional Loretto Analysis
In its collocation orders, the NYPSC failed to consider whether
its collocations policy was an unconstitutional taking. The NYPSC
merely ordered, at first, that the local telephone company choose be-
tween a modification of rates or virtual collocation, without any expla-
nation or discussion of the constitutionality of the order. The local
telephone company first chose virtual collocation, and then, due to
increasingly more difficult requirements, agreed to physical
collocation.
If the NYPSC had ordered physical collocation, this form of regu-
lation would be presumptively unconstitutional as a permanent physi-
toring and controlling the equipment, and in no way were dependent upon New York Tele-
phone to perform any role in relation to the equipment.
104. Contribution is the amount of revenue that New York Telephone receives, for ex-
ample, from its private line services that can be used to subsidize its basic services. With
collocation, the fear is that New York Telephone's contribution amounts from its private
line services would decrease, thereby causing New York Telephone to increase its prices for
its basic services to residential customers.
105. To a regulated entity, deregulation in the form of pricing flexibility has a great deal
of value.
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cal occupation of the local telephone companies' property without just
compensation. A physical collocation order would have resembled the
Loretto statute,10 6 a physical invasion of the landowner's property,
and thus, a per se taking. Like Loretto, a physical collocation order
would have required placement of equipment owned by third parties
on the private property of another, a permanent physical occupation
resulting in a per se taking.
The NYPSC never ordered physical collocation. Instead, it of-
fered the local telephone companies a choice, and they chose virtual
collocation. Under Loretto, virtual collocation is not a per se taking
because it does not involve the permanent physical occupation of
property by a third party. The NYPSC's virtual collocation regime is
similar to regulations requiring landlords to install utility connections,
mailboxes, smoke detectors, or fire extinguishers. 107 The installation
of such devices would not entail a traditional physical invasion be-
cause the equipment is owned and operated by the landowner.
As Justice Blackmun pointed out in his Loretto dissent, analyzing
the New York collocation regime is much more complex than simply
addressing physical touching:
Under the Court's test, the "third party" problem would remain
even if [the landowner] herself owned the cable. So long as [the
CATV company] continuously passed its electronic signal through
the cable, a litigant could argue that the second element of the
Court's formula-a "physical touching" by a stranger-was satisfied
and that [the statute] therefore worked a taking. Literally read the
Court's test opens the door to endless metaphysical struggles over
whether or not an individual's property has been "physically"
touched. 08
Even though under a virtual collocation regime there is no physi-
cal invasion, there is a physical touching of the New York Telephone
collocation equipment by the competitors' signal transmissions. The
U.S. Supreme Court has not adopted the per se test for these types of
invasions. In fact, the majority in Loretto rejected the dissent's analy-
sis, deciding that the per se taking test should be employed narrowly
for actual physical occupation of physical property, but not for other
types of "invasions," e.g., access to wires and cables that merely in-
volve the regulation of property. Under virtual collocation, the equip-
106. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
107. See id. at 440 (The Court's holding did not alter the analysis governing the state's
power to require landlords to comply with building codes and provide certain facilities to
tenants. The Court stated that "so long as these regulations do not require the landlord to
suffer the physical occupation of a portion of [her] building by a third party, they will be
analyzed under the multifactor inquiry generally applicable to nonpossessory takings.").
108. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 450 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ment is dedicated to the competitors, but still owned by New York
Telephone. This invasion of third party signals by way of the equip-
ment is less burdensome to New York Telephone than having a third
party's equipment on its premises. New York Telephone expects to
have relatively undisturbed possession of its premises, i.e., no physical
invasions. As a regulated entity, however, New York Telephone ex-
pects to have restrictions and affirmative duties regarding the use of
its property, which is essentially what the virtual collocation order is
imposing. These restrictions and affirmative duties are infinitely less
burdensome than having the collocation equipment owned by a third
party. Physical "invasions" are more onerous than the physical "inva-
sion" of equipment, which in this situation is merely the regulation of
such equipment.10 9
From a policy standpoint, applying the per se takings test to such
metaphysical invasions would open a pandora's box. With the ad-
vancement of technology, situations arise in which electrical, mag-
netic, and sound waves transgress a landowner's property,
undetected, unseen, and unfelt. To allow compensation under the per
se test would likely inhibit the development of the nascent industries
that use these technologies. Moreover, to require compensation in
these circumstances goes beyond the policy justifications of Loretto."0
In Loretto, the Supreme Court created the per se test for permanent
physical occupations because these invasions affect the landowner's
most important stick in the bundle of rights-the right to exclude. 1 '
A permanent physical invasion of real property is akin to eminent do-
main; it hurts the landowner most because it affects the privateness of
property-the right to exclude. In contrast, physical "invasions" of
utility equipment through pipes, wires, or cables deal with the manner
in which the landowner can use property; this invasion is considerably
less burdensome than a traditional physical invasion. Thus, the per se
test should not be used in this circumstance. 1 2
109. See infra part IV.B., analyzing the NYPSC collocation orders under the ad hoc
test.
110. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 440 (The Court discusses the most salient distinction among
these types of installations-who owns them. If an installation is owned by a third party, a
per se analysis of regulatory takings is used. If it is owned by the landowner, an ad hoc
analysis is used because the landowner would generally have more control over the
installation.).
111. Id. at 419.
112. The cases dealing with this issue have not directly addressed the issue of "physical
touching" of a landowner's facility under the Loretto test. The New York State Court of
Appeals dealt with a similar issue in Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. NYPSC, 520 N.E. 2d
528 (N.Y. 1988), in which the New York NYPSC required utilities to transport natural gas
owned by customers through the utilities' pipelines. Rochester Gas brought suit, alleging
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2. Consent
The local telephone company ultimately agreed to physical collo-
cation. Under the doctrine established in Florida Power Corp., volun-
tary submission to a physical invasion by a landowner precludes a
claim that the property was unconstitutionally taken.
B. Analysis of New York Collocation as a Regulatory Taking
The Loretto Court stated that where there is no permanent physi-
cal occupation of a landowner's property, a court, in analyzing
whether the government's action is a taking, should use the ad hoc
test.1 3 Courts consider the following factors in applying the ad hoc
test: (1) whether there is a rational basis for the government's actions,
i.e., whether the government's regulation substantially advances a le-
gitimate state interest; 14 (2) the character of the government's ac-
tions;115 and (3) the economic impact of the regulation, focusing on
the landowner's investment-backed expectations.1 6
1. Rational Basis-Do the Collocation Decisions Substantially Advance A
Legitimate State Interest?
In determining whether the regulation is a legitimate exercise of
police power, the courts analyze whether the regulation is designed to
advance the "health, safety, morals, or general welfare" of the com-
the regulation was unconstitutional. Although the court used the ad hoc test and ulti-
mately found there was no taking, it noted that the government's action involved "only
minimal, intermittent access to plaintiff's pipelines," and that "[n]o permanent appropria-
tion of the plaintiff's property rights [was] involved." Id. at 325. In citing Loretto, the
court of appeals essentially found that there was no per se taking. The degree of occupa-
tion in the case of natural gas (which is a gaseous physical matter) appears to be similar to
the virtual collocation in New York Telephone (which involves a form of energy or electric-
ity). The only difference is that natural gas passes through a pipeline, whereas telephonic
transmission passes through the collocation equipment.
Similarly, in Kansas Power & Light Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 715 P.2d 19 (Kan.
1986), appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 801 (1986), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
required electric utilities to purchase electricity from co-generators and to make the neces-
sary physical connections to the electric company's distribution system. The court held
that "since a utility is adequately compensated for the intrusion, . . . [the electric com-
pany's] claim that the taking was without just compensation [was] without merit." Id. at
26. In essence, the court found that the Loretto per se test did not apply. There was no
physical intrusion of a third party's power into the electric company's transmission and
distribution system because, by the time the electric power was transmitted through the
electric company's distribution system, it was owned by the electric company. Id.
113. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
114. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
115. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
116. Id.
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munity.117 As far as due process is concerned, "a state is free to adopt
whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote
public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its
purpose. ' 118 Courts will usually sanction such economic legislation,
provided it is not arbitrary or discriminatory.'1 9
In its orders dealing with collocation, the NYPSC emphasized
that it was ordering collocation to foster competition in the local ex-
change market.120 Thus, the collocation orders are a form of eco-
nomic regulation. These collocation orders are distinguishable,
however, from many cases that deal with economic regulation because
the NYPSC is not only regulating the rates or economic viability of
the local telephone company, but also permitting a physical invasion
of the local telephone company's property. Because a great deal of
discretion is given to administrative agencies in devising economic
regulations, that factor in itself should not be determinative. More-
over, by initially allowing the local telephone company to adopt a vir-
tual collocation, the NYPSC did not order the invasion of telephone
company property. Because a relationship exists between the regula-
tion and its intended purpose, the NYPSC is secure under this prong
of the analysis.
In addition, the Rochester Gas case provides precedent; it estab-
lished a rational basis for virtual collocation.1 21 In Rochester Gas, the
legislature required a gas company to give customers access to the
company's pipelines.1 22 The Court held that the law was "a reason-
able regulation consistent with the public interest in developing the
state's resources, furthering competition, and controlling the cost of
natural gas in the retail market. 1 23 Similarly, the NYPSC imple-
mented a collocation policy for the purpose of fostering competition
and reducing retail prices. 124
There is some question whether the Supreme Court has recently
required a tighter nexus between the purposes of the regulation and
117. Id. at 125.
118. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934). Acting pursuant to a state statute
authorizing it to set milk prices, the New York Milk Control Board set the price of milk at
nine cents per quart. Nebbia, a grocery store owner, sold two quarts of milk for thirteen
cents and was convicted for violating the board's order.
119. Id.
120. See Op. No. 89-12, supra note 57.
121. See Rochester Gas & Elec. Co. v. NYPSC, 520 N.E.2d 528 (N.Y. 1988).
122. Id. at 529.
123. Id. at 532.
124. See Baynes, supra note 4, at 18 n.70.
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the actual regulation. 125 The NYPSC could have pursued other means
of achieving the intended purpose-competition-that would have
been less burdensome to the property owner. 126
2. Character of the Government Action
The Pennsylvania Coal Court, as a general proposition, stated
that when a regulation is excessive, there is a taking.127 Courts have
considered a variety of factors in reviewing the character of govern-
ment actions. The Penn Central Court listed the factors that a court
should weigh in reviewing the character of a government action:
whether the government's action is discriminatory, whether the gov-
ernment is using the landowner's property for a government enter-
prise, whether the government is devising the regulation as nuisance
control, and whether the government action constitutes a permanent
physical occupation of the property. 128 None of these considerations
are present here. Furthermore, the list of items mentioned in Penn
Central should be exclusive.
In the collocation proceedings, a strong argument can be made
that the NYPSC went too far. The NYPSC first gave the local tele-
phone company a choice between rate regulation and a virtual collo-
cation regime. The local telephone company chose a virtual
collocation regime. The NYPSC then imposed additional regulations
on the virtual collocation regime. These additional regulations were
particularly burdensome and ultimately caused the local telephone
company to agree to physical collocation.
The additional regulations gave the competitors of the local tele-
phone company the right to select the functionality of collocation
equipment and to jointly monitor and control it. The NYPSC deter-
mined that the competitors had a superior right over the local tele-
phone company to monitor and control the collocation equipment.
This right required a balancing act by the local telephone company
because it would have been jointly responsible for ordering the main-
tenance and repair of competitive equipment. As the NYPSC said,
125. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317 (1994). These cases, though they need not be addressed
here, raise the issue whether the standard for review is elevated in cases that do not involve
a condition placed on a development permit. Nollan and Dolan can be limited to regula-
tions that condition physical invasions on specific types of land uses. In these cases, the
invasion is a taking unless it substantially promotes a legitimate government interest.
126. For instance, the NYPSC could have exclusively pursued a rate regulation ap-
proach to foster competition. See Baynes, supra note 4, at 4 n.6.
127. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415.
128. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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this power to monitor and control, albeit jointly, a competitor's equip-
ment might lead to the leveling of anticompetitive charges against the
local telephone companies. 129 In sum, these requirements severely re-
stricted New York Telephone's options regarding the equipment. It
also gave the competitors access to New York Telephone's facilities to
monitor its equipment, and gave the competitors a role in the place-
ment of the equipment. These requirements were tantamount to own-
ership of the equipment by the competitors. 3 °
3. Diminution in Economic Value
The final factor that is considered under the ad hoc test is the
economic impact of the regulation on the landowner, and particularly
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with the landowner's
investment-backed expectations.131
Collocation does not diminish the economic value of the local tel-
ephone company's property since the local telephone company has no
investment-backed expectation with respect to the collocation prop-
erty.132 First, the relevant space in the local telephone company cen-
tral offices is often useless. With the installation of modern
computerized switching equipment, 133 many telephone company cen-
tral offices contain a great deal of spare, unused space. Collocation
will open this space to competitors, and the local telephone companies
will receive rent for space that previously was unproductive. 34 How-
ever, the local telephone company can argue that, because it may want
to use the space for itself in the future, opportunity costs are involved.
In addition, the local phone company may want to rent the space to
129. See Op. No. 89-12, supra note 57.
130. Although the virtual collocation regime devised by the NYPSC was tantamount to
physical collocation, it was still unacceptable to the competitors. They wanted physical
collocation so they could select the specific brand of equipment that would be placed in the
New York Telephone central offices, and so they could solely monitor and control the
collocation equipment.
Under a virtual collocation regime, the competitors probably feared that New York
Telephone, by jointly monitoring and controlling their equipment, would gain access to
valuable competitive information. Moreover, New York Telephone might have used its
role (in monitoring and controlling) to act in an anticompetitive manner towards the
CAPs, e.g., not repairing competitor equipment within a reasonable time.
131. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
132. An argument can also be made that New York Telephone is a public utility. "Thus
its general investment expectations included the knowledge that it was subject to extensive
regulation." See Rochester Gas & Elec. Co. v. NYPSC, 520 N.E.2d 528, 534 (N.Y. 1988).
133. 5ESS equipment replaced much of the local telephone company's antiquated yet
voluminous switching equipment.
134. Of course, because of the potential concomitant decrease in revenues from in-
creased competition and loss of transport charges from competitors, collocation may harm
the local telephone companies. See Baynes, supra note 4, at 12.
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third parties other than its competitors, something the collocation reg-
ulation and antitrust laws make it very difficult to do.135 These argu-
ments are not particularly strong, however, because the local
telephone companies can now receive rent for this spare space, as op-
posed to speculating about future needs.
In considering the economic impact of the collocation regime, a
court could also consider the rights that New York Telephone received
regarding pricing flexibility and the universal service element-contri-
bution. These rights are analogous to the transferable development
rights that the landowners had in the Penn Central case.13 6 In Penn
Central, the Court stated that "the rights nevertheless undoubtedly
mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has imposed on appel-
lants and, for that reason, are to be taken into account in considering
the impact of regulation."'1 37 The contribution amount in the univer-
sal service element is designed to make up revenues lost by New York
Telephone as a result of collocation. These lost revenues would have
made it more difficult for New York Telephone to maintain its overall
rate structure. Without contribution, New York Telephone might
have had to raise its rates for some vital services, leading to a possible
concomitant decrease in revenues.1 38
To a regulated utility, pricing flexibility has a great deal of value.
This very pricing flexibility allowed New York Telephone to compete
more vigorously in the same market that the NYPSC, through colloca-
tion, is making more competitive. The actual monetary value of pric-
ing flexibility is difficult to quantify, but is akin to untying one arm of
a prizefighter: the prizefighter still may lose, but is saved from certain
defeat as a result of the prior bound condition. Each of these regula-
tory rights, won as concessions to the collocation regime, are major
pluses to New York Telephone and help to diminish the economic im-
pact of collocation.
Economic regulation is very routine and usually passes constitu-
tional muster unless the action involves confiscation and has no ra-
tional basis. Here, the local telephone company cannot hang its hat
135. As noted earlier, the essential facility doctrine requires the owners of an essential
facility to make it reasonably available to competitors. Thus, if a local telephone company
has space available, it would be difficult for it to deny access to a competitor. If a local
telephone company did deny access to a competitor, it might be liable under the antitrust
laws.
136. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137.
137. Id. The Court conceded that if a taking had occurred, this might not constitute
"just compensation." Id.
138. By providing contribution from the competitors, New York Telephone avoided this
potential trap. In addition, it will be able to continue to provide reasonable rates t9 its
residential customers.
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on this expected decrease in revenues because the NYPSC granted it
pricing flexibility to compete more effectively against competitors.
Moreover, the NYPSC ordered the competitors to provide contribu-
tion for the expected loss in private line revenues.
In summary, the New York collocation decisions do not consti-
tute a regulatory taking. Although the character of the government
action is relatively invasive, the collocation orders do not violate the
other ad hoc requirements. The economic value of the local tele-
phone company property is not diminished. In addition, collocation
substantially advances a legitimate state interest-competition.139 On
balance, the benefits to the public outweigh the harms to the
company.
IV
Is the New York Public Service Commission's
Decision to Order Collocation Ultra Vires?
Every administrative agency derives its power from the legisla-
ture through an enabling act. The administrative agency has the
power to act only within the bounds of that statute. If the administra-
tive agency oversteps the bounds of the statute, then its action is ultra
vires and thereby invalid. Noticeably absent from the NYPSC's collo-
cation decisions is any discussion of where the NYPSC derives its
power to order collocation.
As with the takings issue, the NYPSC crafted its collocation or-
ders in an effort to avoid their invalidation on ultra vires grounds.
Although the Public Service Law does not expressly give the NYPSC
power to order physical collocation, it may rather easily be interpreted
as giving the NYPSC power to order virtual collocation.
Article 1, Section 5(1)(d) of the New York Public Service Law
gives the NYPSC the power to regulate "telephone lines." It
provides:
The jurisdiction, supervision, powers and duties of the public service
commission shall extend under this chapter: to every telephone line
which lies wholly within the state and that part within the state of
New York of every telephone line which lies partly within and partly
without the state and to persons or corporations owning, leasing or
operating any such telephone line.14 0
The New York Public Service Law defines the term "telephone
line" to mean the following:
139. See supra note 126.
140. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW, art. 1, § 5(1)(d) (McKinney 1985) (emphasis added).
1995]
The term "telephone line," when used in this chapter, includes con-
duits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, cross-arms, receivers, transmitters,
instruments, machines, appliances and all devises, real estate, ease-
ments, apparatus, property and routes used, operated or owned by
any telephone corporation to facilitate the business of affording tel-
ephonic communication.1 41
Physical collocation involves the placement of a competitor's
transmission equipment in the local telephone company's central of-
fice. The New York Public Service Law gives the NYPSC power to
regulate telephone lines, which may be defined as property or real
estate "owned by any telephone corporation used to facilitate... tele-
phonic communication. 142 At first blush, this statute could be con-
strued as giving the NYPSC the legal authority to order physical
collocation, which requires the local telephone companies to use real
estate or property in a certain way, i.e., placing competitor's equip-
ment in central offices. However, since the statute does not expressly
give the NYPSC the power to order eminent domain 143 or physical
collocation, a stronger argument can be made that these actions would
be ultra vires. 14 This conclusion is supported from a policy stand-
point: society does not want administrative agencies to overstep their
bounds. An agency should exercise only those powers expressly
granted by statute. Because physical collocation is in the nature of
eminent domain, involving the placement of a third party's equipment
on the property of a local telephone company, this policy interest
would be very strong here. The Public Service Law is clearly silent on
whether the NYPSC has the power to order eminent domain.
The definition of "telephone line" in the New York Public Service
Law, which gives the NYPSC power to regulate real estate and prop-
erty owned by local telephone companies, can easily be construed as
giving the NYPSC authority to order virtual collocation. Virtual collo-
cation merely involves the regulation of the use of local telephone
company real estate or property. Therefore, the NYPSC could order
the local telephone companies to place certain equipment in their cen-
tral offices. Under virtual collocation, the collocation equipment is
141. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW, art. 1, § 2(18) (McKinney 1985) (emphasis added).
142. Id.
143. In implementing its collocation order, it was not necessary for the NYPSC to con-
demn the local telephone company's property. The NYPSC could hang its hat on the fact
that it was simply regulating the use of the local telephone company's property. The New
York Public Service Law permits this regulation.
144. Based on its authority to regulate "interconnections" under the Federal Communi-
cations Act, the FCC recently ordered physical collocation. See 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1991).
The D.C. Circuit found that the FCC order was ultra vires because the statutory language
giving the FCC the power to order interconnections did not also grant the FCC power to
order physical collocation. See Bell At. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d, 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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owned by the local telephone company but is used exclusively for the
benefit of competitors.
These conclusions are supported by the New York courts' strong
policy of deferring to the regulatory aegis of the NYPSC. For in-
stance, a court has held that the NYPSC is responsible for administer-
ing the Public Service Law, and that a decision to apply that law to an
area of communications assigned to it for regulation will not be set
aside if there is a rational basis for the conclusion. 145 Moreover, the
NYPSC is the delegate and alter ego of the New York State legislature
acting pursuant to the police power. 146
It should come as no surprise that the NYPSC did not order phys-
ical collocation, but instead initially presented the parties with an op-
tion to foster competition. Once the local telephone company chose
virtual collocation, the NYPSC helped to devise requirements that
made the virtual collocation regime the equivalent of physical colloca-
tion and an administrative difficultly for the local telephone company.
This revised collocation regime might have resulted in antitrust liabil-
ity for the actions taken by New York Telephone. New York Tele-
phone eventually agreed to a physical collocation regime.
V
Conclusion
The New York NYPSC decisions ordering collocation were not a
per se taking because the NYPSC did not actually order physical col-
location, i.e., a permanent physical occupation of a landowner's prop-
erty. Instead, the parties eventually agreed to physical collocation.
Because of the problems that administration and application of virtual
collocation caused New York Telephone and its competitors, the
NYPSC's initial decision caused the parties to move toward physical
collocation consensually. The parties' decision to permit physical col-
location allowed the NYPSC to merely sit back and approve whatever
agreement the parties reached.' 47 The NYPSC was aware of the im-
plication of its virtual collocation ruling-no one was happy with it. It
realized that the administrative burdens New York Telephone in-
cuffed, as a result of the virtual collocation regime, in selecting, moni-
toring, and controlling a competitor's equipment, could potentially
145. In re Radio Common Carriers, Inc. v. NYPSC, 360 N.Y.S.2d 552 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1974), affd, 368 N.Y.S.2d 341 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975).
146. Montalvo v. Consol. Edison Co., 460 N.Y.S.2d 784 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983), affd,
462 N.E.2d 149 (N.Y. 1984) (involving the rate making authority of the NYPSC).
147. This course of action allowed the NYPSC to implement physical collocation in
New York, without actually mandating it and possibly "dirtying its hands."
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result in antitrust liability. However, under Florida Power Corp., the
agreement to allow physical collocation on the local telephone com-
pany's property was not a taking because it was consensual. 14 8
From a policy standpoint, the NYPSC's decision-making process,
i.e., beginning with virtual collocation and ending with physical collo-
cation, and its acquiescence on the takings issue, were sensible
choices. As a result, the NYPSC more effectively regulated to foster
competition-through physical collocation-without paying the re-
quired compensation the initial ordering of physical collocation would
have entailed.
148. The NYPSC's actions do raise questions concerning whether the agreement of the
local telephone company was in fact consensual.
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